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I. INTRODUCTION 
Everett Thomas, the plaintiff-appellant, submits this 
Brief in rep 1 y t • :> 1 1 1 e Brief si ibn Li t1ed by 11: ie Board of 
Education of the San Juan School District, the defendant-
appellee . 
Mr. Thomas stands by his legal analysis, and its 
application to the instant dispute, that is set forth in his 
Opening Brief. He seeks to refrain from unnecessarily 
repeating the arguments, regarding the correctness of v/hich he 
remai ns confi dei 11 that appear ii i that Brief. 
Ii ARGUMENT 
A. THE SChwOi, DISTRICT ERRONEOUSLY SEEKS TO HAVE THE 
COURT FOCUS ITS ATTENTION ONLY ON WHAT HAPPENED AT 
THE S7LME OF ThF ACCIDF 
E " r c • i i: i :i t s , .. a -...-.. I • B :i • r e s e n t e • :I : i i. a p pea 1 
forward, and throughout its Brief, the Board of Education of 
t h e S a n J u a r i S c I i c :> 1 D i s t r i • : t: ( 11 I = D :i s t r :i :: t ) s e = k s t: : k 3 e p 
the Court's attention focused, only on what happened at the end 
of the chain of events that 1 ed to Mr. "T1 Iomas' s severe 1: uri I 
injuries. It is important, however, to the Court/s 
understanding of 11 Ie relevant factual history and the Cour t s 
application of correct legal analysis, for the Court to keep 
in mind that there is' a clear causal chain, at least as a 
matter of triable fact, that begins with the failure of the 
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District to keep the subject Suburban in good operating 
condition and to send it out on the highways of the State of 
Utah in the condition it was in (including a situation in 
which it was not only possible but likely, to the knowledge of 
District maintenance personnel (see, e.g., Haws deposition at 
40-41; 59 (R. at 204-05; 208); and Sanders deposition at 13; 
28; 36 (R. at 215; 218; 220)), that the vehicle would "vapor 
lock," again, on the subject trip. It is understandable, from 
an adversarial perspective, that the District wants to deflect 
the Court's attention from the big picture of what occurred 
and to have the Court focus only on the last event in the 
chain (that is, Mr. Thomas's selfless, if unwise, effort to 
get the engine started and get the school children on their 
way). Relevant tort histories hardly ever, however, occur in 
an instant of time. There is usually a series of significant 
events leading up to the occurrence of an incident that gives 
rise to the filing of a tort lawsuit, and this situation is no 
exception to that rule. 
As explained in Mr. Thomas's Opening Brief, at 9-10, it 
is settled Utah law that negligence and proximate cause 
questions are almost always for the jury. In this case, where 
even the District's non-Robin Benallie agents (who were not, 
like Ms. Benallie (see discussion in following Point B) at the 
2 
scene) acknowledged that it was foreseeable that a person 
would do what Mr. Thomas did in the accident scene 
circumstances (see, e.g., Sanders depo. at 36; 38-39; 45-47 
(R. at 220-21; 223)), the foreseeability element of negligence 
duty law is established. Unlike some "public duty" cases, it 
is clear that only a small number of persons would be in 
harm's way when the District's negligent failure to maintain 
the vehicle came to roost. There is no reason to think that 
Mr. Thomas would have been imperiled if the District had 
properly maintained its vehicle, triable questions on 
proximate cause, as well as negligence, clearly exist, and 
this Court should reverse the District Court's granting of 
summary judgment. 
B. THE DISTRICT HAS GLOSSED OVER THE FACT, WITH RESPECT 
TO THE FORESEEABILITY ISSUE, THAT ROBIN BENALLIE, A 
DISTRICT EMPLOYEE, WAS PRESENT WHEN THE FIRE 
OCCURRED. 
As explained in Mr. Thomas's Opening Brief, in note 1, at 
12-13, the District: Court most curiously ruled that it was not 
foreseeable to the District that Mr. Thomas would do what he 
did. That ruling, set forth in the District Court's Ruling an 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. at 269-71), and 
restated in the District Court's Order on Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment (R. at 272-75), not only flies in the 
face of the testimony of District employee Sanders (R. at 220-
3 
21; 223) regarding foreseeability. It also, in apparent 
disregard of hornbook agency principles that the knowledge of 
an agent will be imputed to the principal, ignores the fact 
that the final link of the relevant chain of events occurred 
right under the nose of Robin Benallie, a District employee. 
And, as pointed out in Mr. Thomas's Opening Brief at 6, 
Ms. Benallie acknowledged, in her deposition at 67-68 (R. at 
233), that she knew that what Mr. Thomas was doing was 
dangerous.1 The District Court's conclusion, in light of these 
record facts, which were brought to the District Court's 
attention in the course of the summary judgment proceedings, 
that what Mr. Thomas did was not foreseeable is difficult to 
comprehend. It was not only foreseeable to the District 
through its non-Benallie agents. It was known to the 
District, as a matter of fact, through Ms. Benallie, that 
Mr. Thomas was doing exactly what he was doing. 
I
 Mr. Thomas feels constrained to reply to the suggestion, appearing at 9-
II of the District's Brief, that Ms. Benallie took any action to stop 
Mr. Thomas from what he was doing. First, Ms. Benallie's testimony that 
she told Mr. Thomas that "they told me to leave it alone" does not equate, 
especially when she stood mute thereafter, with her telling Mr. Thomas to 
leave the Suburban alone. Second, there is record evidence, from paragraph 
12 of the Affidavit of Starr Ebert (R. at 257), and from the deposition 
testimony of Everett Thomas (R. at 244) that, respectively, Ms. Benallie 
did nothing to try to stop Mr. Thomas from what he was doing, and said 
nothing to Mr. Thomas about leaving the vehicle alone or even about any 
instructions she'd received from other District personnel. 
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C. THE "PUBLIC DUTY" DOCTRINE IS OF NO ASSISTANCE TO 
THE DISTRICT ON THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
Taken to its logical, if absurd, extreme, the District's 
"public duty" argument is, in essence, that a governmental 
entity of the State of Utah can never be liable if it 
negligently constructs or designs a road, if it negligently 
maintains premises on which its business invitees are injured, 
if its employees negligently operate automobiles or, as is the 
case here, if its employees negligently fail to maintain a 
motor vehicle. The "public duty" cases cited by the District 
involve situations gualitatively different from what is at 
issue in this case. The crux of the matter appears to be that 
if a governmental entity acts in a negligent fashion or, as is 
the case here, having acted in a negligent fashion, does 
nothing to stop the consequences of what it has put into gear, 
the "public duty" doctrine does not apply. If this were a 
case appropriately analyzed in a vacuum, and if the District 
were correct in its argument that the Court's analysis should 
begin only when Mr. Thomas came on the scene (and in ignorance 
of what Ms. Benallie had put into gear by requesting 
Mr. Thomas's co-worker to help her), then the "public duty" 
analysis might make sense. When, however, as is the case 
here, and as recognized in the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
provisions cited by Mr. Thomas in his Opening Brief at 11-12 
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and in note 2, at 13-14 (the District has offered, in its 
Brief, no response to these parts of Mr. Thomas's analysis), 
the governmental entity's instrumentality is negligently 
maintained and that negligence leads, as a matter of proximate 
cause, to the sustaining of damages, the public duty analysis 
simply does not apply. It applies, as in the cases cited by 
the District, if at all, only in situations in which there is, 
as opposed to affirmative action by a governmental entity 
(such as sending a poorly maintained vehicle out on the 
highways, with a group of schoolchildren on board), only an 
omission to act that is part of the relevant factual history. 
D. A "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP" EXISTED BETWEEN MR. THOMAS 
AND THE DISTRICT, THROUGH ITS AGENT, MS. BENALLIE. 
If, but only if, the Court is not persuaded by any of the 
foregoing stand-alone arguments, that the District Court's 
granting of summary judgment should be dismissed, the Court 
needs to consider the "special relationship" aspect of this 
case. For the "special relationship" line of analysis to 
apply, there must be no relevant antecedent action on the part 
of the governmental entity employee. If the Court accepts the 
analysis set forth in the foregoing, Mr. Thomas contends, the 
Court need not consider whether there was a "special 
relationship" between Mr. Thomas and the District, through 
Ms. Benallie. 
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Mr. Thomas contends that the Court should, in any event 
and if it reaches that question in its deliberations regarding 
this Appeal, conclude that there was, indeed, a "special 
relationship'' between Mr. Thomas, on the one hand, and the 
District, through its agent, Ms. Benallie, on the other hand. 
For Ms. Benallie indirectly requested aid from Mr. Thomas when 
she, according to record testimony, requested help from 
Mr. Ebert, Mr. Thomas's co-worker. See Mr. Ebert's Affidavit 
at para. 3(R. at 256). The District stridently denies that 
Ms. Benallie requested help from Mr. Thomas directly, and 
Mr. Thomas does not contend to the contrary. It is important 
to realize, however, that Ms. Benallie's requesting help from 
Mr. Ebert and standing by, at the scene, while Mr. Thomas 
assisted with the operation and did essentially the same thing 
that Mr. Ebert had been doing, right before Ms. Benallie's 
eyes, was the functional equivalent of her having asked 
Mr. Thomas for help. One wonders what position the District 
would take if it had been Mr. Ebert, the person to whom 
Ms. Benallie made her direct request for help, rather than 
Mr. Thomas, who was injured. Mr. Thomas contends that it 
makes no practical or legal difference, in these 
circumstances, that Ms. Benallie had not directly requested 
help from Mr. Thomas, and that Ms. Benallie, the agent of the 
7 
District, having taken action by affirmatively requesting 
help, created a "special relationship" between the District 
and Mr. Thomas. For good legal and policy discussions 
regarding the creation of "special relationships" in analogous 
asking-for-assistance situations, see, e.g., Schuster v. City 
of New York, 154 N.E.2d 534 (N.Y. 1958); Adamo v. P.G. Motor 
Freight, Inc., 164 N.Y.S.2d 874 (N.Y. App. 1957); and Walker 
v. County of Los Angeles, 238 Cal. Rptr. 146 (Cal. App. 1987). 
E. MR. THOMAS'S CITING OF CASES FROM OTHER 
JURISDICTIONS IS APPROPRIATE AND MAY BE 
HELPFUL TO THE COURT'S DELIBERATIONS. 
The District criticizes Mr. Thomas's analysis set forth 
in Mr. Thomas's Opening Brief by reason of its relatively 
limited discussion of Utah authorities and izs citing of 
authorities from other jurisdictions. The fact of the matter 
is that no Utah case appears to have dealt with the precise 
issues presented by this Appeal. General principles of Utah 
law dealing with duty, negligence, and proximate cause are 
discussed in the Utah cases cited in Mr. Thomas's Opening 
Brief. Cases from other jurisdictions cited in that Brief are 
pertinent and appropriate for this Court's consideration. 
F. REPLY TO DISTRICT'S STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL 
ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION 
Mr. Thomas suggests, in reply to the District's statement 
of belief that neither oral argument or published opinion is 
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desirable, (1) that oral argument may be reasonably necessary 
for full explanation of the relevant issues; and (2) that a 
published opinion would be of assistance to the bench and bar 
of the State. Mr. Thomas will leave those things, however, to 
the sound discretion of the Court, consistent with established 
guidelines and practice. 
III. CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
Mr. Thomas urges the Court to recognize that the District 
owed him the duty of care, on one or more of several bases, 
and likely all of them: the general duty safely to maintain 
its motor vehicles; the duty to him, as a member of a 
foreseeable, finite, and small group of people who would 
foreseeably be injured in the event of another "vapor lock" 
incident; the duty to him in light of the knowledge of 
Ms. Benallie, a District employee and agent, of what was 
transpiring in her presence; and a duty based on the "special 
relationship" established when Ms. Benallie asked for help and 
did nothing while Mr. Thomas, assisting the assister, in 
Ms. Benallie's presence, did something Ms. Benallie 
acknowledged to be dangerous, on a District owned and 
maintained vehicle. 
Mr. Thomas urges the Court to reverse the grant of 
summary judgment and remand this case for trial. 
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Respectfully submitted this J day of October, 1999. 
PETER C. COLLINS 
BUGDEN, COLLINS & MORTON, L.C. 
ERIC P. SWENSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Appellant, Everett Thomas 
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